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ABSTRACT 
Income taxation is complex.  Complexity arises due to the nature of the subject matter 
as well as through the expression (drafting) of tax laws. In an attempt to address the 
second issue the New Zealand Income Tax Act has been reorganised and is currently 
being rewritten in an endeavour to simplify it.  Tax complexity arising from the nature 
of the subject matter is potentially more difficult to address. One of the areas causing 
complexity in this context is the capital-revenue distinction.  
 
Against this background this paper examines recent judicial trends in New Zealand as 
evident in two 2006 cases to ascertain what guidance they provide in this complex 
area. The first, a decision of the New Zealand Court of Appeal, concerned the tax 
treatment of legal expenses incurred by the taxpayer in unsuccessfully seeking 
compensation arising from alleged unlawful acts or omissions in the course of a 
tender process the taxpayer was involved in (Fullers Bay of Islands Ltd v CIR). The 
overall approach of the New Zealand High Court in this case is also very instructive. 
At issue in the second case, TRA Case W26, was whether expenditure incurred in 
earthquake strengthening a building was deductible. These cases provide guidance on 
a number of issues including the continuing use of the fixed and circulating capital 
test; the use of the accounting treatment adopted; the impact regulatory requirements 
have on deductibility and the manner in which work is undertaken (including the issue 
of deferred maintenance). 
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Tax complexity and the capital-revenue distinction – lessons 
to be learnt from two recent New Zealand cases 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Income taxation is “inherently … complex”.1  According to Prebble the concept of 
income is: “in some senses an artificial construct, to the extent that it may also be a 
fiction.”2  Complexity arises due to the nature of the subject matter as well as through 
the expression (drafting) of tax laws. In an attempt to address the second issue the 
New Zealand Income Tax Act has been reorganised and is currently in the final 
process of being rewritten in an endeavour to simplify it. In November 2006, the 
Government introduced the Income Tax Bill 2006 (the Bill). When enacted, it will 
complete the rewrite of New Zealand’s income tax law. The Bill re-enacts and 
consolidates amendments to Parts A to E and also rewrites Parts F to O. The Bill also 
introduces a small number of intended changes to the legislation. Once enacted the 
new Act will apply to income derived from the 2008-09 tax year.3  
Tax complexity arising from the nature of the subject matter is potentially more 
difficult to address. One of the areas that causes complexity in this context is the 
capital-revenue distinction. Trombitas comments that this distinction is “one of the 
most difficult areas of income tax law. It is tempting to say it is the hardest area of tax 
law.”4 Case law is testament to how difficult making this distinction can be. Certain 
judges writing in this area display overtly a sense of judicial depression, possibly 
never better expressed than by Lord Greene in IRC v British Salmson Aero Engineers 
Limited:5  
                                            
1  J Prebble, “100 Years of Income Tax” (1993) Vol 47 Bulletin for International Fiscal 
Documentation 59, at 60. 
2  J Prebble, “Can Income Tax Law Be Simplified?”  (1996) Vol 2:4 New Zealand Journal of 
Taxation Law and Policy 187, at 190. See also J Prebble, “Fictions of Income Tax” (2002) 
Australasian Tax Teachers Association Conference, Manukau (January) and W Chan, “Income – A 
Subjective Concept” (2001) Vol 7:1 New Zealand Journal of Taxation Law and Policy 25. For a 
comprehensive  discussion of the concept of income see K Holmes, The Concept of Income  - A 
multi-disciplinary analysis  (The Netherlands, IBFD Publications BV, 2001). 
3  For further information see http://www.taxpolicy.ird.govt.nz/. For details of the overall 
reorganisation and rewrite see AJ Sawyer, “Rewriting the NZ Income Tax Act 1995 – the Income 
Tax ‘Act’ 2003” (2003) Vol 9:1 New Zealand Journal of Taxation Law and Policy 12;  Inland 
Revenue Department (IRD), “Income Tax Act” (2004)  Vol 16:5 Tax Information Bulletin 46;  D 
McLay and C Macalister “Income Tax Act 2004 – The Scoreboard to Date” (2005) New Zealand 
Institute of Chartered Accountants 2005 National Tax Conference (October) and AJ Sawyer, “New 
Zealand’s Tax Rewrite Program – In Pursuit of the (Elusive) Goal of Simplicity” (2007) 
Australasian Tax Teachers’ Association Conference, Brisbane (January). 
4  E Trombitas, “The New Zealand Judiciary and the Capital/Revenue Distinction – Laying the 
Essential Foundations.”  (2006)  In Adrian J Sawyer (Ed.) Taxation Issues in the Twenty-First 
Century (Christchurch: The Centre for Commercial and Corporate Law Inc.) 51.  
5  IRC v British Salmson Aero Engineers Limited [1938] 2 KB 482, at 492. 
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“…in many cases it is almost true to say that the spin of a coin would decide 
the matter [as to capital or revenue] almost as satisfactorily as an attempt to 
find reasons.”  
Others have described the distinction as “an intellectual minefield in which the 
principles are elusive and analogies treacherous”: Tucker v Granada Motorway 
Services Ltd.6   
Against this background this paper examines two recent New Zealand cases to see 
what guidance they provide in this complex area. The first, a decision of the New 
Zealand Court of Appeal (the Court of Appeal), concerned the tax treatment of legal 
expenses incurred by the taxpayer in unsuccessfully seeking compensation arising 
from alleged unlawful acts or omissions in the course of a tender process the taxpayer 
was involved in (Fullers Bay of Islands Ltd v CIR).7 The overall approach of the New 
Zealand High Court (the High Court) in this case is particularly instructive. At issue 
in the second case, Case W26, heard before the Taxation Review Authority (TRA), 
was whether expenditure incurred in earthquake strengthening a building was 
deductible.  
The remainder of the paper is set out as follows. Section 2 of this paper briefly 
outlines the legislative setting for the capital-revenue distinction in New Zealand. The 
two cases are analysed in sections 3 and 4 of this paper, respectively. Concluding 
comments and observations are made in section 5. 
2 THE LEGISLATIVE SCHEME 
Section DA 1(1) of the Income Tax Act 2004 (“ITA 2004”), called the ‘general 
permission’, provides that: 
“A person is allowed a deduction for an amount of expenditure or loss 
(including an amount of depreciation loss) to the extent to which the 
expenditure or loss is – 
(a) incurred by them in deriving – 
(i) their assessable income; or 
(ii) their excluded income;  or  
(iii) a combination of their assessable income and excluded income; or 
(b) incurred by them in the course of carrying on a business for the purpose of 
deriving – 
(i) their assessable income; or 
(ii) their excluded income;  or  
(iii) a combination of their assessable income and excluded income.” 
                                            
6  Tucker v Granada Motorway Services Ltd [1977] 3 All ER 865, at 869 (per Templeman J) 
(Tucker).  
7  (2006) 22 NZTC 19,716  (Fullers (CA)). 
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The ITA 2004 applies from the beginning of the 2005-2006 income year.8 The 
equivalent provision in the Income Tax Act 1994 (“ITA 1994”) is contained in s BD 
2(1) of that Act.9   
Section DA 1 ITA 2004 is subject to the general limitations in s DA 2 of that Act, 
including the capital limitation (subsection (1)), which denies a deduction for an 
amount of expenditure or loss to the extent to which it is of a capital nature.  The 
equivalent capital prohibition in the ITA 1994 is contained in s BD 2(2)(e) of that Act. 
The intention of the drafting of the ITA 2004 was to ensure that, except in respect of a 
limited number of intended policy changes, no change to the pre-existing law was 
made.10 The general deduction provisions have been rewritten and reorganised as Part 
D of the ITA 2004. However, there has been no change in their application and 
therefore the discussion of cases and IRD comments concerning the ITA 1994 (and 
equivalent sections in earlier tax Acts) in this paper apply equally to the ITA 2004. 
The capital-revenue distinction is also important in New Zealand in part because New 
Zealand does not have a comprehensive capital gains tax.11 The term “income” is not 
defined exhaustively in New Zealand tax legislation, rather a number of specific 
provisions (in Part C of the ITA 2004) outline what is included in the term for income 
tax purposes. In addition, there is a “catch-all” provision, s CA 1(2) ITA 200412 
which provides that: “An amount is also income of a person if it is their income under 
ordinary concepts.” 
The term “capital” is not defined in either the ITA 2004 or ITA 1994. However, there 
is a considerable body of case law on the application of the ITA 1994 provision and 
equivalent provisions in the earlier Income Tax Acts. In New Zealand the “governing 
approach is exemplified in the observations of Lord Pearce”13 in BP Australia Limited 
v FCT 14 (BP Australia) including:15
                                            
8  In May 2004 the New Zealand Parliament passed the ITA 2004 which represented the third stage in 
the rewrite of income tax legislation, using plain language techniques.  
9  Section  BD 2(1) of the ITA 1994 similarly provides an amount is an allowable deduction to the 
extent that  it is an expenditure or loss incurred by the taxpayer in deriving their gross income or 
necessarily incurred by the taxpayer in  the course of carrying on a business for the purpose of 
deriving their gross income. 
10  All intended policy changes are listed in Schedule 22A of the ITA 2004. The Government 
established Rewrite Advisory Panel has been given the role of considering whether any unintended 
legislative changes arise under the ITA 2004 and to make recommendations as to how any such 
changes should be dealt with. For further information see IRD, “Rewrite Advisory Panel” (2004) 
Vol 16:6 Tax Information Bulletin 35 and the Rewrite Advisory Panel website 
http//www.rewriteadvisory.govt.nz.  
11  While New Zealand does not have a comprehensive capital gains tax regime, the ITA 2004 (and 
ITA 1994) treats certain types of gains as being within the term “income” even though generally 
they would be considered capital gains. Such taxable gains include (i) certain profits or gains from 
the sale of land (ss CB 5 – 21 ITA 2004; s CD 1 ITA 1994) and (ii) amounts from personal property 
(ss CB 2 – CB 4 ITA 2004; s CD 4 ITA 1994).  For a discussion of the taxation of receipts and the 
capital-revenue boundary see D Dunbar, “The Taxation of Inducement Payments” (2000) Vol 6:2 
The New Zealand Journal of Taxation Law and Policy 115. 
12  Previously s CD 5 ITA 1994. 
13  CIR v Thomas Borthwick & Sons (Australasia) Ltd (1992) 14 NZTC 9,101, at 9,103 (Thomas 
Borthwick). See also CIR v LD Nathan & Co Limited [1972] NZLR 209; Buckley & Young Ltd v 
CIR (1978) 3 NZTC 61,271; CIR v McKenzies New Zealand Limited (1988) 10 NZTC 5,233 
(McKenzies); Christchurch Press Company Limited v CIR (1993) 15 NZTC 10,206 (Christchurch 
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“The solution to the problem [of distinguishing capital and revenue] is not to be 
found by any rigid test or description. It has to be derived from many aspects of 
the whole set of circumstances some of which may point in one direction, some 
in the other. One consideration may point so clearly that it dominates other and 
vaguer indications in the contrary direction. It is a commonsense appreciation of 
all the guiding features which must provide the ultimate answer… the line of 
distinction is often hard to draw in border line cases; and conflicting 
considerations may produce a situation where the answer turns on questions of 
emphasis and degree. That answer: 
‘depends on what the expenditure is calculated to effect from a practical 
and business point of view rather than upon the juristic classification of the 
legal rights, if any, secured employed or exhausted in the process.’ 
(per Dixon, J. in Hallstroms Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1946) 
72 CLR 634 at p 648).”  
The passage cited above from Hallstroms Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of 
Taxation (Hallstroms) is hereafter referred to as the “Hallstroms test”. 
 
 
3 CIR v FULLERS BAY OF ISLANDS LTD 
3.1 The facts 
The taxpayer company, Fullers Bay of Islands Ltd (Fullers) had established a number 
of successful tourist and passenger operations with some 15 distinct profit centres. Its 
maritime and coach divisions, based in the Bay of Islands, operated a range of cruises, 
tours and ferry services. Fullers decided to expand its existing Auckland business 
(which included lunch and dinner cruises around Auckland Harbour).16 Upon learning 
that the passenger ferry service between Devonport and Auckland City was to be 
offered for public tender, the taxpayer put in a tender to the Auckland Regional 
Council (ARC). At the time the service was run by an unrelated entity, Fullers Group 
Ltd (FGL) with a subsidy of $250,000 per annum from the ARC. By using its 
Auckland ticketing system and one of its existing fleet of eight vessels Fullers 
calculated that it could run the service with a subsidy of only $10,000 per annum and 
tendered accordingly. The turnover of its maritime division was $5.4 million. This 
accounted for about 60% of its total operating revenue in the financial year ending 31 
May 1998. It was estimated that the Devonport run would increase the turnover of the 
maritime division by another $5 - $6 million without requiring proportionate 
                                                                                                                             
Press); CIR v Wattie (1998) 18 NZTC 13,991 (Wattie (PC)) and Birkdale Service Station Ltd v CIR 
(2000) 19 NZTC 15,981 (Birkdale). 
14  [1966] AC 224.  
15  Ibid, at 265. 
16  Its Auckland base  comprised two offices and staff,  which promoted the Bay of Islands activities. 
The taxpayer had in place an infrastructure and computer ticketing system that could readily 
accommodate growth. 
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expansion of its infrastructure. Fullers understood that, if successful, it would have a 
monopoly for the duration of the five year ferry service contract. 
The tender was viewed favourably by the ARC who decided to contract with Fullers 
for the provision of the Devonport ferry service. However, upon the ARC disclosing 
to FGL the particulars of Fullers tender (and prior to final notification of the results of 
the tender process), FGL offered to provide a non-subsidised service (known as a 
Commercial Registration). Fullers were unaware of this and were not given the 
opportunity to make a competing unsubsidised bid.  The ARC accepted FGL’s tender. 
The taxpayer issued proceedings against both the ARC and FGL, arguing inter alia 
that the ARC had breached contractual obligations it owed to the taxpayer which 
caused it to lose the ferry contract (resulting in loss of income of $6.2 million).17 The 
taxpayer’s allegations were dismissed in a subsequent court case.18 The taxpayer 
sought to deduct the legal fees paid to its solicitors of $612,792.14 in respect of the 
proceedings in the 1999 income year. 
3.2 The TRA 
At first instance, the TRA19 concluded that the legal fees were deductible under s BD 
2(1)(b) ITA 1994. The TRA saw the issue as whether Fullers was seeking to enforce a 
process contract or to obtain specific performance of a contract to supply ferry 
services. It was accepted by the TRA that, while Fullers wanted the outcome of the 
Court case to put it in a position where it could obtain a final contract, due to the 
ARC’s acceptance of FGL’s unsubsidised bid, it was never possible for the court to 
actually award Fullers specific performance of the final contract. The expenditure was 
therefore aimed at obtaining the benefits of the process  or preliminary contract. 
Seeking to vindicate a right to a fair contractual process, even if successful, was not to 
acquire any property of an enduring nature. The finding that the expenditure was on 
revenue account was reinforced by the accounting treatment.  
 The Commissioner of Inland Revenue (CIR) appealed to the High Court.  
3.3 The High Court  
3.3.1 Introduction 
The decision of Baragwanath J20 is important as it “contains a very useful and 
comprehensive discussion of the capital/revenue principle”.21 In addition, his 
Honour’s reasoning was approved on appeal by the Court of Appeal. 
                                            
17  The $6.2 million was calculated by Fullers as the discounted value of future cash flows that Fullers 
would have generated from operating the Devonport Ferry service if it had been awarded the 
contract. Remedies sought by Fullers included  a declaration that, if the ARC had properly managed 
the process, Fullers would have been awarded the contract, and a declaration that Fullers did hold 
the contract for five years from the date of the order. 
18  Fullers Cruises Northland Ltd v Auckland Regional Council & Fullers Cruises Ltd, 4 June 1999, 
Paterson J, HC Auckland CP438/96. 
19  Case W42 (2004) 21 NZTC 11,387. The TRA is a judicial authority to hear and determine inter alia 
challenges to assessments of tax. 
20  CIR v Fullers Bay of Islands Ltd (2004) 21 NZTC 18,834 (Fullers (HC)). 
21  See n 4, at 51.  
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As an introductory comment his Honour noted the CIR and taxpayer followed the 
Privy Council in Wattie (PC)22  in accepting the Hallstroms test. 
 
3.3.2 The submissions 
The CIR argued, relying on the judgment of Dixon J in Sun Newspapers Ltd v FCT 
(Sun Newspapers),23 that the legal fees were related to an attempt by the taxpayer to 
obtain a capital asset or advantage in the form of the ferry service contract. This was 
to be distinguished from the individual contracts for services made by the ferry 
operator with individual passengers. The new Devonport service contract would 
potentially expand Fullers’ profit-making structure. 
Two major submissions were made by the taxpayer. First, they argued the purpose of 
the litigation  (and hence the legal fees) was not to secure the contract for services, 
rather to make good alleged procedural deficiencies in the tendering process 
employed by the ARC (ie to set aside the result of an unlawful procedure and allow 
the tender process to begin again). Second, it was argued that even if the purpose of 
the litigation was to secure the contract, the contract would not have comprised a 
capital asset but, on the basis that Fullers’ business consisted of providing passenger 
services, the contract would have been held on revenue account. 
3.3.3 The decision 
3.3.3.1 The relevance of the facts 
Baragwanath J, at the outset of his judgment, reiterated the importance of the “precise 
analysis of the relevant facts of each case”,24 as illustrated by BP Australia Ltd  and 
Strick (Inspector of Taxes) v Regent Oil Co Ltd25 where the appellate committees of 
the Privy Council and House of Lords similarly constituted came to different 
conclusions concerning the tax treatment of trade tie payments. His Honour also 
referred to the Court of Appeal decision of Birkdale26 where, on different facts again, 
the court held, with one exception, that the trade tie payments from Mobil to 
independent retailers were revenue payments.27  
                                            
22  (1998) 18 NZTC 13,991; [1999] 1 WLR 873, at 180. For a discussion of this case which concerned 
the tax treatment of a lease incentive paid to a firm of accountants to move into new premises see 
AJ Maples, “Lease Inducements” [1999]  New Zealand Law Journal (March) 53 and AJ Maples,  
“Are Lease Incentives Taxable? – A Trans-Tasman Comparison” (2000) Vol 3:3 Journal of 
Australian Taxation 208 and Trombitas, see n 4, at 57-59.  
23  (1938) 61 CLR 337. 
24  See n 20, at 18,841. 
25  [1966] AC 295. 
26  See n 13. 
27  Other examples where the courts have come to different conclusions despite similar facts include 
the English case Transco plc v Dyall (HMIT) (2002) SpC 310 (Transco) and the New Zealand case 
Auckland Gas Co Ltd v CIR (2000) 19 NZTC 15,702 (PC); [2000] 3 NZLR 6 (Auckland Gas). In 
the former case the UK Special Commissioners came to a completely opposite conclusion to that of 
the Privy Council in Auckland Gas, treating the insertion of polyethelene piping into existing cast 
iron pipes as on revenue account. For a discussion of these cases see AJ Maples,  (2002) 
“Comment: Just when you thought Auckland Gas was the final word on Replacement with 
Polyethylene Pipe” (2002) Vol 8:4 New Zealand Journal of Taxation Law and Policy 351. In 
 8
In determining cases concerning the capital-revenue distinction which are at the 
borderline, a correct assessment and understanding of the facts is therefore crucial as 
one fact may be sufficient to ‘tip the balance’ and distinguish the case under review 
from an apparently similar or identical decision.. As  Lord Pearce observed in BP 
Australia in distinguishing capital and revenue: 28
“the line of distinction is often hard to draw in border line cases; and 
conflicting considerations may produce a situation where the answer turns on 
questions of emphasis and degree.” 
Green, commenting on the judgments of former President of the Court of Appeal Sir 
Ivor Richardson, also observes:29  
“What [his] judgments also highlight is the critical nature of the facts of a 
particular case … at the end of the day the question is essentially one of 
analysing the facts of the particular case and the decision is often a finely 
balanced one… Furthermore, as is often the position, in many of the cases 
there was a crucial finding of fact or an agreed fact which ultimately 
determined the result in the case.” 
3.3.3.2 The capital-revenue tests 
Baragwanath J applied the following six tests to the facts before him:30
 
(a) whether the expenditure was for the purpose of carrying on an existing trade or 
rather to enable the taxpayer to enter that trade (essentially an application of the 
Hallstroms test). The early New Zealand decision of Commissioner of Taxes v 
Ballinger,31 which was cited with approval by Dixon J in Hallstroms Pty Ltd v 
Federal Commissioner of Taxation,32 was mentioned under this test. 
 
 In this case Baragwanath J determined that the practical purpose and business 
objective of the expenditure was not just to win the court case but to secure the 
Devonport-Auckland ferry service as a major revenue producing addition to its 
business. The legal fees were “a set up cost to allow the respondent to enter the 
Auckland ferry market in a substantial way”.33  This service would have 
produced for the company an entirely new revenue stream. His Honour 
                                                                                                                             
respect of the importance of the facts, one commentator on Auckland Gas wrote, there is: “… scope 
for the legal mind to tweak the facts slightly and produce a quite different outcome. What if, for 
example, [Auckland Gas] had inserted PE piping of a fractionally larger diameter so that the new 
piping fitted tightly within the old, and acted as an inner lining? Quite arguably this would not have 
produced a substantially different asset.”: A Borrowdale, Headnote and Casenote Digest “Re 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Auckland Gas Company Ltd and Poverty Bay Electricity (sic) 
Board v Commissioner of Inland Revenue” (May 1999) Company & Securities Law Bulletin 50, at 
51. 
28  [1966] AC 224, at 264-265. 
29  R Green, “Sir Ivor Richardson and the Capital v Revenue Dichotomy” (2002)  Vol 8:2 New 
Zealand Journal of Taxation Law and Policy 169, at 180. 
30  The criteria used by Baragwanath J are similar to those used in the Court of Appeal, see for 
example McKenzies (1988) 10 NZTC 5,233, at 5,236.  
31 [1904] 23 NZLR 188. For a discussion of this case see n 4.  
32  (1946) 72 CLR 634. 
33  See n 20, at 18,842. 
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considered that this was a strong pointer to the classification of the expenditure as 
capital.  
 
(b) whether the expenditure was recurrent or made once and for all, ie “in the 
traditional lawyers’ expression uno flatu (in a single breath).”34  
 
 In this context his Honour distinguished between expenditure on the 
“[a]cquisition of a business by the slow process of conventional advertising and 
building up goodwill”, which is on revenue account, with acquiring “it by 
purchase” which is likely to be on capital account.35 The expenditure was not 
recurrent but made on a “once and for all” basis - Fullers were attempting to 
secure the income stream uno flatu by securing the contract. 
 
(c) the distinction between the business structure and the ordinary process by which 
it is operated to obtain regular returns. Expenditure in respect of the former is a 
capital item while the latter is on revenue account. His Honour observed that 
expenditure as part of the process by which a business operates (and which is 
deductible) can maintain or over time develop an asset36 or it may enhance a 
business (and still be deductible).37 Baragwanath J noted the test overlaps with 
the second test.  
 
 Under this test, his Honour concluded the ferry contract would constitute “a 
major addition to the structure of the respondent’s business which it would 
operate to obtain regular returns from passenger fares.”38  
(d) whether the expenditure was intended to result in an enduring asset. In this regard 
his Honour acknowledged that “enduring” is a relative term. Baragwanath J 
commented that “the oil cases show that according to circumstances a three-year 
contract may be properly characterised as either capital or revenue according to 
circumstances.”39
 In summing up his Honour observed that the fact that the expenditure did not 
produce an asset or advantage of an enduring nature “injects hindsight which is 
irrelevant (see the authorities cited in Milburn NZ Ltd v C of IR at pp 17,023-4 
para [34-8]); what matters is its purpose.”40
 (e) whether the expenditure is from fixed or circulating capital.  
 His Honour commented that this was seen to be difficult to apply and reference 
was made to the BP Australia decision and Milburn NZ Limited v CIR 
(Milburn).41 For a discussion of this test see section 3.5 of this paper.  
                                            
34  Ibid, at 18,841. 
35  Ibid. 
36  His Honour cited Bolam v Regent Oil Co Ltd (1956) 37 Tax Cas 56 and BP Australia as examples. 
37  His Honour cited Rhodesia Railways Ltd v Income Tax Collector [1933] AC 368 as an example. 
38  See n 20, at 18,843. 
39  Ibid, at 18,841. 
40  Ibid, at 18,843. 
41 (2001) 20 NZTC 17,017. 
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(f) how the payment would be treated on ordinary principles of commercial 
accounting.  
  This did not provide his Honour with much assistance. For a discussion of the 
application of this test generally see section 3.6 of this paper. 
3.3.3.3 Uno flatu or gradually? 
His Honour’s comments in respect of (b) and (c) above highlight an important point in 
determining issues on the capital-revenue border - the way the expenditure is 
undertaken is crucial to the treatment of the expenditure. Had Fullers’ gradually built 
up its Auckland customer and revenue base, such expenditure arguably would have 
been deductible. Conceivably, over time it may have ended up with a revenue base 
equivalent in size to that it would have acquired had it won the ARC tender, yet that 
former expenditure could have been an ordinary operating expense. This is 
presumably his Honour’s point in (c), expenditure in respect of a business operations 
can “develop an asset or it may enhance a business”,42  and yet be deductible.  
The impact of the way in which expenditure is conducted is also evident in cases 
concerning repairs and maintenance. The English case Transco43 and the New 
Zealand Privy Council case Auckland Gas44 are a good example of this principle. 
Both concerned the insertion of polyethelene piping into existing cast iron pipes, yet 
the former case held the expenditure was on revenue account while the latter on 
capital account. There were several factual differences between the two cases, the key 
being the way the work was carried out. In Auckland Gas there was the wholesale 
replacement (sector by sector) of substantial parts of the network of cast iron pipes 
with polyethylene pipe insertions, with the result that in substantial parts of the system 
gas was no longer distributed through cast iron pipes but polyethelene pipes. This 
work was based on a replacement programme. By contrast, Transco did not insert 
polyethylene pipes into whole sectors of its cast iron pipes; rather polyethylene pipe 
was only inserted into the fractured or worn part of the cast iron pipe leaving the 
remaining ‘fit’ cast iron portion(s) in place to continue to carry gas along with the 
inserted polyethylene portion. Despite the manner in which the work was done:45
“[u]ltimately, [in Transco] over a period it is quite conceivable as the 
remaining cast iron portions of the pipes are also replaced that whole portions 
of the relevant part of the Transco network will be in fact comprised of 
polyethylene instead of cast iron (as in Auckland Gas), and thus the character 
of the network will have changed (or been upgraded). However, because of the 
way the repair is being carried out, such substantial change will occur on an 
incremental basis rather than whole areas being upgraded on a systematic 
basis. With replacement of the entire network occurring at the rate of 1 percent 
a year,46 the considerable period over which the work is being carried out, no 
                                            
42  See n 20, at 18,843. 
43  See n 27. 
44  Ibid. 
45  Maples, see n 27, at 361. 
46  This replacement rate of 4 percent over the relevant period compares with the insertion of 
polyethylene pipe into 23 percent of the total mains and 32 percent of the steel services in the five 
years at issue in Auckland Gas. 
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doubt was also influential. However, in the author’s view, even if the Transco 
replacement programme occurred at an accelerated rate, the different 
‘piecemeal’ approach to the carrying on of the repair work would still have 
produced the same court finding.” 
3.3.3.4 Conclusion 
Overall, his Honour was not persuaded by the TRA’s analysis. As to the TRA’s view 
that the occasion of the expenditure was to enforce a claim to fair contractual process, 
he observed that that was only part of the total object of the litigation which was to 
secure the ferry contract. Further, Baragwanath J considered that, as what matters is 
purpose, the fact that the expenditure produced no asset or advantage of an enduring 
nature was irrelevant. 
Baragwanath J also disagreed with the TRA’s view that the expenditure was not 
related to the structure of the business. Although operating a business so as to build it 
up does not require conventional revenue expenditure to be reclassified as capital, a 
dominant purpose of acquiring assets to ensure a future revenue flow is likely to lead 
to classification of the expenditure as on capital account. His Honour also considered 
that how Fullers would have treated the profit centre of a new stand-alone Devonport 
ferry operation did not determine the essential question of the object of the 
expenditure made to acquire it.  
Accordingly, Baragwanath J was satisfied that the object of the expenditure was to 
secure a capital asset and therefore his Honour allowed the appeal.  
3.4 The Court of Appeal 
Fullers’ appealed to the Court of Appeal. The appeal was heard before Glazebrook J 
(who delivered the court’s judgment), O’Regan and Robertson JJ. 
3.4.1 The arguments 
Counsel for the taxpayer submitted that Baragwanath J had applied the wrong 
conceptual framework so that his decision was wrong at law. In particular it was 
submitted: 
(i)   The object of the litigation was to enforce the process contract and not to 
secure the ferry contract, and realistically the most that could have been 
achieved by the litigation was an award of damages; 
(ii)   The ferry contract was, in any event, merely one of a number of contracts and 
thus any expenditure to secure it would be on revenue account; 
(iii)  Any damages received as a result of the litigation would have been for loss of 
profits and therefore on revenue account. The expenditure to secure that result 
was therefore deductible. 
The CIR submitted that: 
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(i)  The business objective of the litigation must have been to secure the contract 
or damages to compensate for its loss and that the correct focus was the 
ultimate business objective and not the immediate means employed to achieve 
the business ends; 
(ii)  The legal fees could be either capital or revenue in nature depending on the 
purpose for which they were incurred. In this case the expenditure was 
incurred to secure the contract for the Devonport ferry service and must be on 
capital account. The fact that this objective was not achieved was irrelevant;47
(iii)  damages for the permanent loss of a capital asset, such as damages for the loss 
of the ferry contract, were on capital account. 
3.4.2 The Court of Appeal’s findings 
 The Court of Appeal rejected Fullers’ submissions essentially for the reasons set out 
in Baragwanath J’s judgment and in the IRD’s submissions.  
In respect of the taxpayer’s first submission, their Honours’ did not believe the matter 
could be looked at so narrowly. From a practical business point of view the object of 
the litigation was to enforce the process contract as a step to secure the ferry contract 
or damages equivalent to the value of the ferry contract otherwise there was no point 
in issuing the litigation. 
Their Honours’ did comment that even if the object of the litigation had merely been 
to enforce the process contract, this was designed to ensure a chance of securing the 
contract or compensatory damages. On the basis of how the claim was framed:48
“the assumption was that, were the process contract properly enforced, the 
ferry contract would have followed, given the preferred bidder status and 
Fullers’ willingness to abide by the conditions. There was thus no substantive 
difference between the process contract and the ferry contract itself.”  
In rejecting Fullers’ second submission, their Honours’ considered “it incontrovertible 
that the ferry contract would have been on capital account in the particular (and rather 
unusual) circumstances of this case.”49 (emphasis added) The ferry contract was a 
long term monopolistic contract, representing a major expansion of Fullers’ business 
into the Auckland area. It was expected that it would double the operating revenue of 
the marine division, a division which contributed some 60 percent of Fullers’ revenue. 
Accordingly any expenditure to secure the contract was on capital account, whether or 
not it resulted in the contract being obtained. The fact that the litigation was 
unsuccessful did not change the nature of the expenditure. 
With respect to the third point concerning damages, their Honours’ stated that what 
was claimed were damages for the loss of a capital asset, the ferry contract. Although 
the value of capital assets is often calculated on the basis of discounted cashflows, 
                                            
47  Citing Milburn (2001) 20 NZTC 17,017, at 17,023–24 and John Fairfax & Sons Ltd v FC of T 
(1959) 101 CLR 30, at 49 as authority. 
48  Fullers (CA), see n 7, at 19,725. 
49  Ibid, at 19,726. 
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that did not turn a claim into one for loss of profits.50 It remained a claim for loss of a 
capital asset. It was irrelevant that any income from the contract, if it had been 
awarded, would have been on revenue account as income from any capital asset is on 
revenue account. 
The wording used by the Court of Appeal “… it is incontrovertible…” is very strong 
and raises the issue of what is and what is not a significant contract – where is the 
dividing line? In Fullers case the contract would have increased the taxpayer’s 
turnover by approximately 60 percent. Would the outcome of the case have been 
different had the contract increased turnover by a lesser figure, for example 10 or 20 
percent.  This may be an issue for inter alia accountancy and law firms tendering to 
supply accounting, audit or legal services. If a tender, if successful, would have a 
significant impact on the firm’s turnover, would the expenditure (including staff 
costs) in preparing the tender be capital expenditure? This will depend in part on the 
term of the contract. A contract for a period of 3 years may be indeterminate; a period 
of five years may indicate capital expenditure. The fact that the firm is able to service 
the contract from existing staff (perhaps when it has ‘quiet patches’) and resources is 
irrelevant, Fullers required no additional infrastructure. In Fullers case the tender 
would have given them monopolistic rights for a period – a successful audit tender or 
tender to provide legal services may provide similar ‘monopolistic’ rights. 
3.5 The fixed and circulating capital test  
Baragwanath J in the High Court in Fullers (HC) referred to difficulties with applying 
the test in BP Australia51 and Milburn.52
 
3.5.1 Background 
The distinction between fixed and circulating capital is found in Adam Smith’s An 
Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations53 and was initially used 
in company law cases involving the payment of dividends.54 While it found support in 
                                            
50  Borthwick, n 13,  is an example of this principle. In this case, the taxpayer received an amount as 
consideration for the variation and partial surrender of rights under a long term supply contract.  
The amount was determined through a discounted cash flow calculation of the expected receipts for 
the balance of the contract term. The Court of Appeal determined the amount received was for the 
surrender of a capital asset (the supply contract) and therefore on capital account. 
51  See n 14. 
52  See n 41. 
53  (1983, Penguin), at 374.  For a discussion of this test and its origins see J McDermott and J Prebble, 
“Circulating Capital: a Judicial Label” (2003) Paper presented at 15th Annual Australasian Tax 
Teachers Association Conference,; available at http://pandora.nla.gov.au/tep/23524 and AJ Maples, 
“The Fixed and Circulating Capital Test: Down and Now Out in New Zealand?” (2005) Vol 11:3 
New Zealand Journal of Taxation Law and Policy 315. 
54  The first such case was Lee v Neuchatel Asphalte Co (1889) 41 ChD 1 in which a shareholder 
unsuccessfully opposed the payment of a dividend out of the previous year’s surplus on the basis 
that the capital of the company had been lost and that, until the loss had been made good no 
dividend could be paid. The court held there was no legal requirement for a company to make up 
lost capital before paying dividends so long as the company was trading profitably and could still 
pay its creditors. In reaching its conclusion the court distinguished between  fixed (or sunk) capital 
and circulating capital, saying that the former could be left to waste or diminish without being 
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a number of similar cases it has also been criticised in a number of company law 
cases.55  
The fixed and circulating capital test has been utilised by the courts in the tax context 
since it was adopted by Viscount Haldane in the early House of Lords decision John 
Smith & Son v Moore (John Smith).56 In this case, Mr John Smith,  who carried on the 
business of coal and shipping agents (as a sole proprietorship), died. Under the terms 
of his trust disposition and settlement, his son took over the business on the condition 
he pay to the trustees a sum equal to the net assets of the business but excluding any 
goodwill. Included in the assets acquired by the son were certain unexpired contracts 
with colliery owners for the supply of coal at fixed prices, all of which contracts 
expired on or before a specified date. The son paid £30,000 for these contracts.  
The House of Lords (Viscount Finlay dissenting) held this expenditure was on capital 
account. Viscount Haldane, in particular, referred to Smith’s definition of fixed and 
circulating capital.57 Applying Smith’s distinction between the two types of capital to 
the facts  his Lordship stated that it was not by selling the contracts that the taxpayer 
had acquired from his father that he made profits; it was by retaining those contracts - 
they were part of his fixed capital, not the circulating capital.58  
The concept has been accepted in a number of subsequent cases including Mallet v 
Staveley Coal & Iron Co Ltd,59 and Anglo-Persian Oil Co Ltd v Dale (Anglo-Persian 
Oil),60 and, of most significance for New Zealand tax law, BP Australia61 where it 
was listed by Lord Pearce as one of the tests to determine the capital-revenue 
boundary. The test has been recognised and applied in a number of New Zealand 
cases including in the High Court62 and  Court of Appeal. The most significant  
                                                                                                                             
replaced. McDermott and Prebble note that a different but similar concept had earlier appeared 
under the name of “floating capital” in Bouch v Sproule (1887) 12 App Cas 385, 393-394 per Lord 
Herschell: McDermott and Prebble, ibid, at 5. 
55  See for example Scrutton LJ in Ammonia Soda Co Ltd v Chamberlain [1918] 1 Ch 266 who stated 
the distinction had been misunderstood (297) and, agreeing with Lord Halsbury in Dovey v Cory 
[1901] AC 477 that the concepts were not appropriate in concrete cases.   
56  [1921] 12 TC 266. See further R Krever, “Capital or current: The tax treatment of expenditures to 
preserve a taxpayer’s title or interest in assets” (1986) Vol 12 Monash Law Review 49. 
57   According to Viscount Haldane: “Adam Smith described fixed capital as what the owner turns to 
profit by keeping it in his own possession, circulating capital as what he makes profit of by parting 
with it and letting it change masters. The latter circulates in this sense.”: James Smith, ibid, at 282.  
58  Viscount Haldane commented: “… [The taxpayer] had bought as part of the capital of the business 
his father’s contracts. These enabled him to purchase coal from the colliery owners at what we were 
told was a very advantageous price… and reselling it for more, but he was able to do this simply 
because he had acquired among other assets of his business, including the goodwill, the contracts in 
question. It was not by selling these contracts, of limited duration though they were, it was not by 
parting with them to other masters, but by retaining them, that he was able to employ his circulating 
capital in buying under them. I am accordingly of opinion that, although they may have been of 
short duration, they were none the less part of his fixed capital.”: ibid, at  282 – 283. 
59  [1928] 13 TC 772. 
60  [1931] All ER 725. 
61  [1966] AC 224, 264-265.  
62  AA Finance Ltd v CIR (1993) 15 NZTC 10,171 (whether gains made by a finance company for the 
sale of government stock were assessable income); Christchurch Press Company Ltd v CIR (1993) 
15 NZTC 10,206 (whether wages of employees involved in plant installation were deductible) and 
Lockwood Buildings Ltd v CIR (1996) 17 NZTC 12,483 (whether management fees were 
deductible). 
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discussion of the test in the Court of Appeal can be found in McKenzies63 and CIR v 
Inglis (Inglis).64  
The test has been criticised in a number of cases including by Lord Macmillan in Van 
den Berghs Ltd v Clark65 who did not find the test “very helpful”. In BP Australia, 
although their Lordships applied the test, in that case they commented that:66  
“This test of fixed and circulating capital is not always helpful and not always 
easy to apply or appropriate; in some circumstances it can be critical, but in 
others it is not very easy to use or to apply; it is not very significant.” (emphasis 
added) 
 
 
3.5.2 The two strands 
Harris et al67 note that this test has been considered in two different situations. First, 
“whether a particular item of expenditure was made from fixed or circulating 
capital…”68 (emphasis added) (the ‘source of the funds’ application). Under this 
application, the source of the funds used provides an indication of the character of an 
item of expenditure. Thus money provided from the fixed capital of a business would 
constitute capital expenditure while money provided from the circulating capital 
would be revenue. The second application is whether payment was “…made for fixed 
or circulating capital…”69 (emphasis added) (the ‘use of the funds’ application).  The 
IRD recognise the two formulations of the test and that it may not be as useful as 
other tests.70
                                            
63  In McKenzies case, which concerned the deductibility of a lump sum payment made by a lessee to 
the lessor in consideration for the surrender of the lease, Richardson J acknowledged the test as one 
of the BP Australia factors and that it had received mixed judicial support: McKenzies see n 13, at 
5,240-5,241. His Honour aligns a ‘use of funds’ application of the test to the identifiable asset test 
(the former simply being a restatement of the latter): Maples, see n 53, at 338-339.   
64  (1992) 14 NZTC 9,180. Inglis concerned the deductibility of share losses incurred by a 
management consultant. Under then section 65(2)(e) of the  Income Tax Act 1976 (“ITA 1976”) 
profits or gains derived from the sale of personal property were assessable income where the 
property was acquired for the purpose of sale. Cooke J and McKay J in Inglis supported the use of 
the test, the former arguably extended its application:  McDermott and Prebble, see n 53, at 18. 
65  [1935] AC 431, 443. Krever comments that the fixed and circulating test: “… largely fell from 
favour after Lord Macmillan suggested in Van den Berghs Ltd. v Clark [1935] A.C. 431 that the 
distinction was not helpful in deciding the issue for tax purposes. Nevertheless, it is often revived, 
particularly in Australia. See, for example, the dissenting judgment of Barwick C.J. in London 
Australia Investment Co. v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1974] A.T.C 4213.”:  see n 56.  
66  See n 14, at 237. 
67  G Harris, C Ohms, C Plunket, A Sharp and N Smith, Income Tax in New Zealand  (Wellington, 
Brookers Ltd, 2004), at 516. 
68  Anglo-Persian Oil is cited as an example of this application of the test.  
69  Mallet v Staveley Coal & Iron Co Ltd [1928] 13 TC 772 is cited as an example of this application 
of the test. The High Court decision in Christchurch Press (1993) 15 NZTC 10,206 is another case 
where this application was adopted (at 10,210).   
70  IRD, “Year  2000 expenditure – income tax deductibility Public Ruling BR Pub 98/4” (1998) Vol 
10:11 Tax Information Bulletin 3, 8. See also  IRD, “Financial Planning Fees – Income Tax 
Deductibility” (2000) Vol 12:5 Tax Information Bulletin 26; and IRD, “Deductibility of 
Sponsorship Expenditure” (2002) Vol 14:9 Tax Information Bulletin 33. 
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3.5.3 Wild J in Milburn  
 Baragwanath J in Fullers observed that the fixed and circulating capital test had 
proven difficult to apply, citing BP Australia71 and Wild J in Milburn.72  The second 
case noted, Milburn, contains the strongest recent criticism of the test (the source of 
funds application).73 The case concerned cement manufacturer Milburn NZ Ltd which 
incurred expenditure on obtaining the consents or licences necessary to develop three 
sites into quarries for aggregate and lime for use in its cement and concrete 
businesses. The High Court concluded that the amounts were capital expenditure 
because they were part of the cost of creating the permanent structure which produced 
Milburn’s taxable income. The consents and licences were enduring and not recurrent 
in nature. While his Honour believed the expenditure was “reasonably clearly 
capital”74 and therefore resort to the BP Australia indicia was unnecessary, Wild J 
briefly considered each test to confirm whether his initial conclusions were correct. 
In respect of the fixed and circulating capital test his Honour commented:75
“With all respect to the eminent economists and Judges who have propounded 
this test, I am unable to view it as compelling, or even useful. It is essentially a 
‘source of funds’ test. I cannot see any logical or reliable nexus between the 
source of monies, and what they are spent on. It is well established that the 
character of expenditure (capital or revenue) by a payer taxpayer does not 
determine its character as a receipt in the hands of a payee taxpayer: Tasman 
Forestry Limited v C of IR (1999) 19 NZTC 15,147 (CA) at p 15,153 … 
Although the monies here are within a single taxpayer’s business, the position 
seems to me analogous. Thus, where the monies came from is no reliable guide 
in determining the nature of their expenditure.” 
Expert accounting evidence was presented for the taxpayer that the payments were 
from circulating rather than fixed capital. While this pointed to a revenue 
characterisation Wild J observed that it was “also indicative of the long and soundly 
established nature of the business of” the taxpayer.76  
His Honour concluded his discussion of the test stating: “I prefer to disregard this test 
and wonder whether it might not be given a quiet burial?”77  
3.5.4 Baragwanath J in Fullers (HC) 
Baragwanath J  did not go as far as Wild J in Milburn78 but did question the test’s 
continued relevance, support for this view being provided  from an ‘outside’ source – 
the 1993 company law changes:79  
                                            
71  See n 14, at 269. 
72  See n 41, at  17,025-17,026. 
73  There has been prior recognition by the High Court of the criticism of this test, see for example 
Sinclair J in Trevathan v CIR; Western Developments Ltd v CIR (1984) 6 NZTC 61,746, at 61,748. 
74  See n 41, at 17,025. 
75  Ibid, at 17,025 – 17,026. 
76  Ibid, at 17,026. 
77  Ibid, at 17,025. 
78  Ibid. 
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“The abandonment of the concept of nominal capital by the Companies Act 
1993 points to the unreality of treating the source of funds as a significant 
guide to whether for tax purposes the acquisition is to be treated as on capital 
or revenue account.” 
Rather than focusing on the source of funds, Baragwanath J stated (in Fullers 
(HC)):80 “What matters is rather the purpose of the expenditure than its source.”  
Baragwanath J did consider the test in the case – it supported a revenue finding; 
however, in the light of his earlier comments, his Honour stated that the source of the 
payments (in this case from gross profit receipts) was “of little significance”.81   
It is a little ironic that Baragwanath J draws support for questioning the test’s 
relevance from changes in company law given that the test has its foundations (at least 
in the law) in company law.  
3.5.5 The Court of Appeal in Fullers 
Their Honour’s  in the Court of Appeal did not discuss any of the six capital-revenue 
tests referred to by Baragwanath J. Counsel for the IRD did submit in respect of the 
fixed and circulating capital test, that it:82 “is not particularly helpful in either way on 
the facts of this case” and that “this test has been criticised in New Zealand – see 
Milburn”. As the Court of Appeal did not specifically address this (or any of the tests) 
the Court’s view presumably is unchanged ie the test may apply in some situations. It 
is unfortunate that the Court did not address the criticisms of the test. This was the 
first significant opportunity for the  Court of Appeal to consider the application of the 
test since Wild J’s comments in the High Court in Milburn. As indicated, preceding 
Milburn there is relatively limited comment from a number of recent Court of Appeal 
cases on the test overall indicating support for it (in particular McKenzies83 and 
Inglis84). 
3.5.6 The future for the test 
Due to the court hierarchy in New Zealand whether in fact this test continues to be 
used in New Zealand ultimately depends on the position adopted by the Court of 
Appeal and the Supreme Court of New Zealand in the future. At the time of writing 
no tax cases have been heard by the Supreme Court85 concerning the capital-revenue 
                                                                                                                             
79  See n 20, at 18,841. The Companies Act 1993 abolished the concept of par value and, as a 
consequence, the concept of nominal capital. “The perceived safeguards provided by the concept of 
par value in practice proved to be illusory. Instead of shares having a par value, the directors of a 
company must determine the consideration for which shares are to be issued and must resolve that 
in their opinion the consideration for and terms of the issue are fair both to the company and 
existing shareholders.”: CCH New Zealand Ltd, New Zealand Company Law and Practice, (CCH 
New Zealand) (electronic database), para 3-140. 
80  Ibid. 
81  Ibid, at 18,843. 
82  See n 7, at 19,724. 
83  See n 13. 
84  See n 64. 
85  The Supreme Court of New Zealand commenced hearing cases from 1 July 2004. 
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distinction and therefore at this stage there is no indication   of the approach likely to 
be taken by the Court.  Harley observes:  
“In general, and perhaps particularly in the tax field, not many cases will 
justify applications for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. The existence of 
concurrent findings of fact in the courts below will preclude many such 
appeals.”86
In the author’s view the test, as interpreted as a ‘source of funds’ test, has arguably 
outlived its usefulness in New Zealand as an indicator of the capital-revenue divide. 
This application of the test is unlikely ever to be decisive; at best, it may confirm a 
conclusion based on other indicia from BP Australia. In this context McDermott and 
Prebble similarly believe the test is “unsound”87 and support Wild J’s comment that 
the test be given a decent burial.88  
The test, as a “use of the funds” application, in the author’s view when applied in this 
manner is a restatement and application of the identifiable asset test. Support for the 
contention of the link between the ‘use of funds’ interpretation and the identifiable 
asset test is drawn from the approach of the Court of Appeal in McKenzies.89 The 
identifiable asset test has also received the support of the Court of Appeal in Wattie v 
CIR.90 This interpretation of the fixed and circulating test will remain, whether or not 
under this name, certainly in the form of the ‘identifiable asset’ test.91  
3.6 Ordinary principles of commercial accounting  
3.6.1 The usefulness of this test 
How a payment would be treated on ordinary principles of commercial accounting is 
one of the guiding principles to determining the character of expenditure,92 and was 
recognised by Baragwanath J in Fullers (HC) in that capacity. There are New Zealand 
cases where the courts have referred or had regard to financial accounting principles 
to assist in determining the issue at hand.93 One such example is Birkdale where the 
                                            
86  GJ Harley, “The Expected Impact of the Supreme Court of New Zealand on Tax Cases” (2006) Vol 
22 New Zealand Universities Law Review 76, at 101.  
87  McDermott and Prebble, see n 53, at 25. 
88  Ibid, at 26. 
89  See n 13. 
90   (1997) 18 NZTC 13,297.  
91  The distinction between fixed and circulating capital is also useful as a descriptive term, essentially 
as an alternative to distinguishing between “capital assets” and “stock-in-trade”: see Case W24 
(2004) 21 NZTC 11,387. As noted by the IRD:  “‘Fixed capital’ and ‘circulating capital’ are 
relevant terms to a business that has fixed plant and circulating capital that are turned over while 
making profits and would apply to a business investor.”: IRD, “Financial Planning Fees – Income 
Tax deductibility” (2000) Vol 12:5 Tax Information Bulletin 26, at 35. 
92  See McKenzies and BP Australia. 
93  It is also accepted in New Zealand case law that generally accepted accounting principles and 
ordinary commercial practices are to be applied in the computation of income for tax purposes to 
the extent the legislation allows: Lowe v CIR [1981] 1 NZLR 325, at 345; (1981) 5 NZTC 61,006, 
at 61,024. In addition there is currently a trend in New Zealand to explicitly use accounting 
principles by incorporating them into the tax system: B Lemmens, “Aligning Research and 
Development Expenditure Tax Treatment with Accounting Treatment: Comparing New Zealand 
and International Approaches”, (2002) Vol 8:1 New Zealand Journal of Taxation Law and Policy 
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Court of Appeal commented that the accounting treatment in that case provided a 
minor degree of support for the conclusion that the trade-tie payments were revenue.94 
In CIR v Mitsubishi Motors New Zealand Ltd (Mitsubishi)95 the Court of Appeal 
commented that financial accounting principles and good commercial practice could 
not be substituted for the statutory test of deductibility “but they may assist ‘in 
ascertaining the true nature and incidence of the item as a step towards determining 
whether it answers the test’…”.96  
However, the New Zealand courts have traditionally been more reticent to use and 
rely on this test than their English counterparts.97 For example, Richardson J, in CIR v 
Farmers’ Trading Co Ltd98 cautioned against undue reliance on accounting principles 
and commercial practice.99 Similarly, in Birkdale, Blanchard J stated that the proper 
accounting treatment was not determinative.100 Wild J in the High Court in Milburn, 
also commented that the correct accounting treatment was not determinative of the 
correct tax treatment and when two legitimate, but opposing accounting treatments are 
available, accounting principles ceased to be a useful guide to tax treatment.101  
In Fullers,102  Baragwanath J did not find the accounting treatment adopted by the 
taxpayer of particular assistance. Neither the taxpayer nor the CIR saw the accounting 
treatment as particularly relevant in the current situation. His Honour considered the 
accountants’ treatment of expenditure as being on revenue account was simply an 
expression of their opinion which differed from the position they had taken in the 
preceding years.103  
Even where the accounting and tax treatment is the same, this may be for quite 
different reasons. Counsel for the CIR submitted in Fullers (CA)104 that for 
accounting purposes what was important in determining  the treatment of the 
expenditure was the outcome of the expenditure ie, the accounting definition of an 
                                                                                                                             
33. Lemmens cites the research and development tax amendments and the trading stock reforms 
introduced in the late 1990s as examples of this trend (at 33). 
94  See n 13, at 15,991 (Blanchard J). 
95  [1994] 2 NZLR 392 (CA). 
96  Ibid, at 397. 
97  See for example Milburn n 41, at 17,026 where the CIR submitted (and accepted by Wild J) that the 
accounting principles test has more relevance in the United Kingdom than New Zealand. See also 
CIR v Mitsubishi Motors New Zealand Ltd (1995) 17 NZTC 12,351, at 12,352-12,353  (PC) where 
Lord Hoffman explained the reason for the difference in emphasis between the courts in New 
Zealand and the United Kingdom.  
98  [1982] 1 NZLR 449, at 455; (1982) 5 NZTC 61,200, at 61,206 (CA). 
99  For a further discussion of the Rt Hon Sir Ivor Richardson’s views on this issue see Ivor 
Richardson, “The Concept of Income and Tax Policy”, [1990] 4 Canterbury Law Review 203, at 
208-9 and Ivor Richardson, “The Impact and Influence of Accounting and Economic Principles on 
Taxation Law”, (1998) Vol 4:1 New Zealand Journal of Taxation Law and Policy 18. 
100  See n 13, at 15,991  (Blanchard J). 
101  See n 41, at  17,028. 
102  See n 20. 
103  When the legal fees were first incurred they were shown as an “abnormal item” (although in terms 
of the accounting standards it was acknowledged it would have been more appropriate to term it as  
an “extraordinary item”) and deductible for accounting purposes. For tax purposes the fees were 
added back as non-deductible in two of the relevant years and as deductible in the third year on the 
basis inter alia that the substance of the claim was based on a loss of profits calculation. 
104  See n 7, at 19,725. 
 20
asset was not met in the year so a deduction was claimed. For tax purposes, the 
important factor was what the expenditure was designed to achieve from a business 
perspective. 
Shewan and Boyce note that the scheme of the income tax legislation has:105
“…led the Court of Appeal to the view that there was significantly more scope 
for the influence of accounting principles and commercial practices on the 
income side of the tax equation than for deductions.” 
From the policymakers, it is also of significance that the New Zealand Government 
rejected a proposal during the rewrite of the core provisions to include an express 
requirement to have regard to accounting principles if an item’s tax treatment was 
unclear.106 Shewan and Boyce conclude that “accounting principles should only be 
used as a reference point for tax” and ultimately tax liability should always be 
determined according to the wording of the legislation.107
While therefore the accounting treatment is one of the tests used in determining the 
capital-revenue expenditure it clearly will not always be relevant and when it may be 
useful will normally be in support of the other tests, it will not be determinative.  
3.6.2 International Financial Reporting Standards 
New Zealand is following the worldwide move to adopt International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) for financial reporting purposes. In New Zealand the 
adoption of IFRS has been allowed from 1 January 2005, and is mandatory for 
financial reporting periods beginning on or after 1 January 2007. This will have an 
impact on some current taxation policies as these are linked to some accounting 
practices. In September 2006 the Policy Advice Division of the IRD and the New 
Zealand Treasury released  an officials’ issues paper considering the “tax policy 
issues that could arise from the adoption of IFRS within the context of existing policy 
on alignment between tax and accounting.”108 The officials’ issues paper does not 
address the impact that IFRS may have insofar as the capital-revenue distinction is 
concerned.  
                                            
105  J Shewan and P Boyce, “Derivation and Deductions Revisited”, (2002) Vol 8:2 New Zealand 
Journal of Taxation Law and Policy 181, at 189-190 referring to CIR v Farmers’ Trading Co Ltd 
[1982] 1 NZLR 449, at 456-7; (1982) 5 NZTC 61,200, at 61,207-8. 
106  Ibid, at 191. 
107  Ibid. 
108  The Policy Advice Division of the Inland Revenue Department and the New Zealand Treasury, 
“The tax consequences of adopting financial international financial reporting standards” 
(Wellington, September 2006), 1; also available at 
http://www.taxpolicy.ird.govt.nz/news/archive.php?year=2006&view=468. Legislative changes that 
need to be made as a result of IFRS are intended to be enacted for the 2008-2009 income year. The 
issues paper specifically addresses the impact of IFRS’ on the trading stock rules, research and 
development expenditure, financial arrangements, revenue recognition and generally accepted 
accounting principles (GAAP).  The officials’ issues paper comments that “it does not propose to 
consider a comprehensive alignment of tax legislation with accounting standards at this time.” (at 1, 
6).  
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As the incorporation and application of the test in the capital-revenue area is based on 
case law rather than explicitly stated in the tax legislation (unlike, for example, the 
trading stock valuation rules which are specifically aligned in the ITA 2004 with an 
accounting standard) the continued application of this test presumably will be 
determined by the courts. However, depending on the direction that IFRS’ take, over 
time there may be a greater or lesser use of accounting standards in the capital-
revenue area both here and overseas.109
4.0  CASE X26110
4.1  The facts 
The taxpayer was a member of a two-person partnership. In 1989 the partnership 
purchased the leasehold of a building for $655,000 (plus GST) and, in 1997, the 
freehold of the land for $177,000 (plus GST). In a letter of 18 March 1999 the 
partners were advised by the Wellington City Council  that the building failed to 
comply with the earthquake strength capacity required under the 1965 Loading Code. 
The conclusion was that the building may collapse in a moderate earthquake. The 
letter continued:  
“Section 66 of the Building Act states that in such a situation, Council could 
barricade your building and give notice for the owner to reduce or secure any 
danger within a specified period of time…” 
The policy of the Council was to allow property owners some time to remedy any 
defects prior to invoking its powers under the Building Act 1991. 
 
In addition, shortly after acquiring the freehold, the partners were advised that the 
building was a Heritage property.  As such the partners could get financial assistance 
from the Council in undertaking the earthquake strengthening. To obtain the 
assistance, an encumbrance would be placed upon the title to preserve the building. 
The partnership engaged its own consulting engineers to undertake a feasibility study 
outlining the weaknesses of the building and the work required to bring it up to the 
required level of seismic strength. The report (in October 1999) identified the 
following weaknesses:  
• The floors and roof were not adequately tied to the brick walls, 
• There was minimal seismic resistance at ground level at the front of the building, 
and 
• There was inadequate seismic resistance in the rear walls.  
The report also recommended the following remedial work: 
• A new structural steel and concrete frame towards the front of the building, 
• Post-tensioned strands and a steel frame on the rear brick wall, 
                                            
109  The issues paper comments concerning GAAP: “The use of ‘generally accepted accounting 
practice’ in tax legislation is ambulatory in that as GAAP changes with the adoption of IFRS for 
financial reporting purposes, these changes will be accepted for taxation purposes. Legislative 
changes to deal with unexpected tax consequences arising from these provisions after the adoption 
of IFRS should be considered where appropriate.” (Ibid, at 3). 
110  (2006) 22 NZTC 12,303. 
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• New steel in floor bracing and wall/floor trim, 
• Drilled and grouted reinforcing to the front parapet wall, 
• Gib clad bracing walls added to the second floor, and 
• Roof framing and sarking tied into the parapet walls. 
This work was carried out at a total cost of $107,210.45. The council provided 
$45,000 as financial assistance, with the partnership paying the balance. This project 
was planned to take the consulting engineers six to eight weeks to complete, but took 
about 12 weeks. 
The partnership claimed a deduction (under s BD 2 ITA 1994), as repairs and 
maintenance, for the net cost to the partnership of the strengthening work in the 
income tax year in which it was incurred.  The IRD considered that the work went 
beyond the repair and maintenance of the existing asset and brought into existence a 
better asset than had previously existed, namely, a seismically strengthened building 
with an extended life expectancy. As such the expenditure was on capital account and 
depreciable, but not deductible. The IRD adjusted both the partnership returns and the 
two partners’ assessments to reflect that conclusion. One partner disputed that 
adjustment. The other partner has accepted the CIR’s assessments and was not a party 
to this dispute. The case was heard by the small claims jurisdiction of the TRA. 
4.2 The decision of the TRA 
4.2.1 Small claims jurisdiction 
 
Every TRA has two levels of jurisdiction – general and small claims. As in the 
general jurisdiction, cases in the small claims jurisdiction are heard by an Authority 
judge. The primary objective of the small claims jurisdiction is to provide a simple, 
fast-track procedure for hearing small, ‘simple’111 revenue cases.  
A taxpayer may elect to have a dispute heard in the small claims jurisdiction where: 
(a) the facts are clear and not in dispute, 
(b) the tax to pay or the tax effect112 does not exceed $30,000, 
(c) there are no “significant legal issues of precedent” involved.113
 
In this case the facts were clear. The tax in dispute (calculated on half of the 
expenditure of $62,210.45) was below the threshold.114 In respect of the third issue, 
his Honour commented:115  
                                            
111 Cases where the facts are clear and there are no precedential implications are referred to as ‘simple’ 
cases. 
112  “Tax effect” means the value of an adjustment or amendment to an assessment calculated by 
applying the taxpayer’s applicable marginal rate (s 13B(2), Taxation Review Authorities Act 1994 
(TRAA 1994)). The $30,000 threshold applies to each case not revenue type. Thus, where a dispute 
concerns three types of taxes for a taxpayer, if the combined value of the tax in dispute exceeds the 
threshold, even though the disputed tax for each issue may be below the threshold, the dispute 
cannot be heard in the small claims jurisdiction. 
113  Section 13B(1), TRAA 1994.  
114  The threshold was increased from $15,000 to $30,000 with application to disputes that commenced 
under the relevant procedure in the TAA 1994 on or after 1 April 2005. 
115  See n 110, at 12,316. 
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“Accordingly, I deal with it under that [small claims] jurisdiction but observe 
that (in terms of s 13B of the Taxation Review Authorities Act 1994 — which 
creates that small claims jurisdiction) significant legal issues for the general 
taxpayer are involved so that the small claims jurisdiction seems 
inappropriate.” 
 
The meaning of the phrase “significant legal issues of precedent” used in the TRAA 
1994 was considered in Case W32116 which concerned an application by the CIR to 
have a case transferred from the small claims to the general jurisdiction of the TRA. 
Willy DCJ stated:117  
“It is difficult to know quite what is meant by a ‘significant legal issue of 
precedent.’ It might mean that the legal issue raised must be ‘significant’ to 
the administration of the particular revenue statute, or it might mean that the 
precedent created must be significant and not some minor addition to the 
relevant law, or it might be that the word ‘issue’ (always a difficult chameleon 
of a word) is otiose.”  
His Honour favoured the latter construction – the word ‘issue’ should be ignored and 
the phrase to read ‘a significant legal precedent’. Of importance to the present case, 
Willy DCJ stated the question to determine whether or not the case should be 
transferred was:118   
“…does this case involve questions of disputed fact or will the outcome create 
an important precedent which will assist the Commissioner and later taxpayers 
in their understanding of the relevant legislation.” 
 
Decisions of the small claims jurisdiction differ from those made under the 
Authority’s general jurisdiction in a number of ways: 
(a)  the decisions are not normally published.119 However, Regulation 18 of the 
Taxation Review Authorities Regulations 1998 (the Regulations) permits an 
Authority to publish a decision or authorise its publication (hence the 
publication of this case).  
(b)  they have no precedential effect in the sense that they may not be cited as  
authority in any subsequent case or for any other purpose.120 They can only be 
used as precedent by the affected taxpayer.121
                                            
116  (2004) 21 NZTC 11,318. 
117  Ibid, at 11,320. 
118  Ibid, at 11,321. 
119  A New Zealand Government  Consultative Document considered whether decisions of the small 
claims jurisdiction should be published, even in a summarised form, along the lines of a case head 
note with details of the taxpayer’s identity removed: New Zealand Government, “Resolving Tax 
Disputes: Proposed Procedures – A Government Consultative Document”, (Wellington, New 
Zealand Government, December 1994), para 7.42. This was rejected on the basis that publication in 
a summarised form could be misleading, causing taxpayers to draw incorrect conclusions (para 
7.43). The Government considered that publication of small claims decisions was not necessary as 
they are non-precedential. 
120  Regulation 18(5). 
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(c)  the decision is final - there is no right of appeal from a decision made by a 
TRA in its small claims jurisdiction.  
 
It is surprising, given the Willy DCJ’s interpretation of “significant legal issue of 
precedent” in Case W42 and the fact that Barber J in Case X26 believed there were 
“significant legal issues” involved in that case that his Honour heard the case in this 
jurisdiction where the decision cannot be used as precedent. An Authority may, of its 
own motion, transfer a case from the small claims jurisdiction to either its general 
jurisdiction or to the High Court.122 A challenge will be transferred if inter alia it 
“involves or may involve significant legal issues of precedent”.123 The TRA has 
similar authority to transfer a case from the small claims jurisdiction at the request of 
the CIR,124 however, it would appear that no such request to the TRA was made. 
 
As the decision was decided in the small claims jurisdiction it will therefore have no 
precedential value. Despite this it will be interesting to see whether the arguments 
canvassed in this case will be raised ‘afresh’ at some later date in a future case and 
also whether both the IRD and taxpayers refer to it while not necessarily ‘applying it’ 
as precedent or follow it. In this regard it is worth noting  that an earlier decision of 
the TRA, case No 18/01; Decision 8/2001, heard in the small claims jurisdiction, is 
referred to in commentary on an aspect of the income tax legislation.125 The author is 
also aware of one international Chartered Accountancy firm who, in a publication 
discussing Case X26, do not mention that it originated in the small claims jurisdiction 
and therefore is non-precedential, rather implicitly the case is represented as having 
authority (albeit lesser given its TRA status).126
4.2.2 The relevant principles 
At the start of his judgment Barber J acknowledged the factors developed by the 
courts to determine whether expenditure is on capital or revenue account but that 
resort to those factors is not necessary if the expense is, on its face, clearly either 
capital or revenue in nature.127 It is only in borderline cases that the tests developed 
by the court should be used.128 Barber J summarised the applicable approach as:129
                                                                                                                             
121  This is confirmed by the definition of “precedent” in Regulation 18(6) which defines the term to 
mean: “… a decision of the Authority that affects or may affect the outcome of a separate and 
unrelated dispute between the Commissioner and a taxpayer other than the disputant.” This 
definition was introduced into the Regulations in 2004 and applies to disputes that are commenced 
under the disputes procedures on or after 1 April 2005. 
122  Section 138N(2), Taxation Authorities Act 1994 (TAA 1994). 
123  Section 138O(2), TAA 1994. 
124  For example, where the CIR considers there are “significant legal issues of precedent” involved: s 
138O(1), TAA 1994. 
125  See C.E. Bibbey, Section CH 2 “Benefit from share option or purchase schemes”, Brookers Smart 
Tax Commentary, paras 2.2 and 2.3. The author of the Commentary finds some support from this 
case for her views concerning an aspect of the operation of s CH 2 of the Income Tax Act 1994. 
126  PricewaterhouseCoopers, “Repairs and maintenance” (2006) Issue 19 Tax tips (5 October) 1. 
127  For support for this position see for example Milburn where Wild J observed: “BP [Australia] 
considers a number of tests which assist in drawing the capital/ revenue  distinction. As the Privy 
Council recognised in BP, resort to those tests is unnecessary in clear cases.”  (n 41, at 17,021) 
128  In his judgment Barber J (see n 110, at 12,318-12,319) specifically referred to passages of Dixon J 
in Sun Newspapers [1938] 61 CLR 337, and the Hallstroms test, noting that it had found favour 
with the courts including in the Privy Council in BP Australia and CIR v Wattie  as well as the 
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“An appreciation of the totality of the expenditure (Colonial Motor Co Ltd) 
from a practical and business point of view (Hallstroms, BP Australia, and 
Borthwick) will normally be determinative of the nature of an expense.” 
While this approach is that accepted by the New Zealand courts with respect to the 
capital-revenue distinction generally, the New Zealand courts have in the past adopted 
a slightly different approach to repairs and maintenance cases, such as Case X26. The 
approach is illustrated by the Court of Appeal and Privy Council in Auckland Gas 
where the courts used the following three-fold analysis: 
 
(a)  the first step is to identify the object to which the test of repair or replacement 
is being applied;130
(b)  the effect of the work on the character of the object is an important 
consideration. The main issue here is whether the character of the object has 
changed as a result of the expenditure; 
(c)  there is no rigid test or description that can be applied and the answer depends 
upon a consideration of all the circumstances. 
While his Honour did not specifically refer to this approach in his decision, implicitly 
Barber J has used it; determining the asset (the building) had been changed from one 
under risk of demolition to one that will continue to generate income. 
 
 
4.2.3 Expenditure on Capital Account 
Barber J at the outset of his decision concluded that the expenditure was clearly on 
capital account. It was to bring into existence advantages of a lasting nature which 
improved an identifiable asset, ie the building, as part of the partnership’s income 
earning structure (as distinct from its income earning process).  
Applying the Hallstrom’s test, his Honour stated from a practical and business point 
of view that the project was intended to make a major alteration to the structural 
integrity of the property so it would meet statutory requirements and to avoid the 
possibility that the building would become a useless asset (due to the intervention of 
the Council):131
“Prior to the project the building, according to the disputant’s own engineer: 
‘has a capacity less than 50% of the 1965 code … and that the building may 
collapse in a moderate earthquake …’. The project was ‘to achieve full 
compliance with Chapter 8 of NZ1900:1965 in terms of applied loadings.’ At 
                                                                                                                             
Court of Appeal which had adopted it as exemplifying the “governing approach” in New Zealand: 
Borthwick, see n 13, at 9,103. 
129  See n 110, at 12,326. 
130  For this part of the inquiry it is crucial that the subject matter is correctly identified: see for example 
Auckland Trotting Club v CIR [1968] NZLR 967 and Poverty Bay Electric Power Board v CIR 
(1999) 19 NZTC 15,001, at 15,006. Misidentification of the asset in question could lead to distorted 
results if too large or too small a subject matter were identified. 
131  See n 110, at 12,320. 
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the end of the project the engineers were able to certify that the seismic 
strengthening was completed. Accordingly, the project did not merely 
maintain or repair the property but substantially improved it: going from less 
than 50% earthquake strength compliance to full compliance. The end result 
was a substantially improved property.” (emphasis in original) 
Barber J observed that the case Colonial Motor Co Ltd v CIR132  (Colonial Motors) 
was directly on the point of the tax treatment of earthquake strengthening costs. In 
that case, an unsound warehouse under treat of demolition because of earthquake risk 
was strengthened and transformed:133  “into a sound commercial building with a 
substantial revenue earning life.”  
There is a key difference between the cases - in Colonial Motors the work undertaken 
by the taxpayer went further than that in Case X26. In particular in the former case the 
taxpayer gutted the interior of each floor, enclosed the light well, erected a new glass 
curtain wall on one side of the building, removed a mezzanine floor, transferred all 
building services to a new central core location, completed seismic strengthening 
work, added a ninth floor penthouse and refurbished the interior throughout so as to 
provide good quality modern non-air conditioned office space. The strengthening 
consisted of the construction of two reinforced concrete shear walls from ground to 
sixth floor and the installation of diagonal steel bracing on the seventh and eighth 
floors. The work in Case X26 did not go so far, being limited to earthquake 
strengthening work and in the author’s view is closer to the borderline between capital 
and revenue expenditure than the Colonial Motors case.  
His Honour recognised the differences between these two cases, commenting:134
“Of course, in the present case the work undertaken was not as extensive as 
that in Colonial Motor Co Ltd v CIR, but the same result must follow. There 
was work undertaken to improve the building’s earning-capacity by making it 
earthquake code compliant and thus avoiding the sterilisation of the asset. 
While the work in this case was to make the building earthquake-code 
compliant, it ensured the continued availability of the asset as part of the 
income-earning structure of the taxpayer’s partnership. That structure is a 
concept of capital. The process of earning income is revenue in concept.” 
(emphasis in original) 
The unanswered question is, in the event that a taxpayer is required to do work on 
their property to keep compliant with the property code, is there a level of work which 
would be deductible? Where is the line between such deductible and non-deductible 
work? In determining the divide one potentially relevant case is Conn v Robins Bros 
Ltd135 (Conn) where, despite the substantial work undertaken on the building 
(including structural work), the expenditure was on revenue account. The taxpayer in 
Case X26 did not argue Conn in support of its position. In Conn extensive alterations 
were made to a 400 year old building including replacement of a slate roof with 
                                            
132  (1994) 16 NZTC 11,361(CA). 
133 Colonial Motor Co Ltd v CIR (1994) 16 NZTC 11,060, at 11,062 (HC). 
134  See n 110, at 12,323. 
135  [1966] 43 TC 266. 
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corrugated asbestos, removal of walls, insertion of steel girders to support the upper 
storeys, removal of rotten floorboards and the floor reformed in concrete.  
Clearly where structural work is undertaken there is a greater likelihood that the work 
will go beyond repairs. However, that does not mean that all structural work will be 
on capital account. Conn is support for that proposition. In fact, in that case Buckley J 
commented that:136 “… the fact that there were alterations in the structural  details of 
the building does not seem to me to be a good ground for proceeding upon the basis 
that the work produced something new.”  
Barber J in Case X26 observed that:137 “Most building repairs involve work on, or 
even replacement of, building fabric in order to renew it. In the present case, the 
building work was to add to the existing structure in order to assist retain it as a 
structure.”  
In considering the character of the expenditure his Honour referred to a  valuation 
report which showed that the total cost of the strengthening work was approximately 
9.9  percent of the valuation of the property (or 10.5 percent adopting other figures). 
Barber J indicated it was appropriate to use the total cost of the project rather than 
merely the cost to the partnership as the latter measure would give a distorted and 
inaccurate reflection of the scope of the project. The cost to the partnership could not 
alter the amount the remedial work actually cost.  
While the cost of such work may provide an indication as to the extent of the work 
(and therefore the nature and character of the expenditure), this measure should be 
used with caution.  It is conceivable that the cost of work could, as a percentage of the 
asset value, be exceedingly high and still of a repair nature, and conversely capital 
expenditure a low percentage of the asset value (perhaps through the use of new 
technology) but still capital based on its effect on the object. Ultimately it is the effect 
the expenditure has on the asset that is important, for example has it simply repaired 
the asset or is it a major alteration.  
His Honour accepted the evidence of the CIR’s expert that the work did increase the 
capital value of the building. Barber J also noted that there would be an immediate 
threat of loss of the income from the property, as an income-earning structure, if it 
were to be barricaded by the Council. This could result in a  loss in value of the 
property.  
In the author’s view, as with measuring the cost of the work against the asset’s value, 
the impact on the value of the asset should be treated with caution. Unlike the ITA 
1976 which contained a specific section allowing deductions for repair and 
maintenance (including a reference to the impact of the work on the asset’s value) the 
ITA 1994 and ITA 2004 do not contain a separate provision. Arguably an asset in 
need of repair may increase in value after the repair work. A van requiring a new 
exhaust system may have a lower value prior to the replacement of the system. 
Depending on the replacement, especially if a longer life exhaust system is installed 
than previously existed, the repair  may even increase the value of the asset to a figure 
                                            
136  Ibid, at 275. 
137  See n 110, at 12,326-12,327. 
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greater than prior to when the repair work was required. The key issue is the nature of 
the work based upon a practical and business point of view not its effect on the value 
of the asset. In this example the repair with a longer lasting component will still be 
deductible (despite its impact on the assets value) because it will not change the van. 
Barber J did acknowledge the potential limits of focussing on the impact of the work 
on the value of the asset stating:138 “[t]he valuation issue is but one indicator of the 
nature of the expense...”  
4.2.4 Deferred Repairs and Maintenance 
The taxpayer submitted that the costs were incurred undertaking deferred repairs and 
maintenance which were no more than accumulated repair and thus of a revenue 
nature. Two cases were discussed by his Honour in response. In the first, Odeon 
Associated Theatres v Jones,139 the taxpayer acquired some rundown theatres which 
had not been maintained due to wartime restrictions. Deferred maintenance was 
undertaken (including replacement carpets and redecoration) and this was considered 
to be on revenue account. The distinguishing factor in this case according to Barber J 
was that wartime restrictions prevented normal repair and maintenance from 
occurring and requiring a single “catch-up” effort once those restrictions were lifted. 
No such restrictions existed in the present case.  
In addition (and in the author’s view more significantly) the effect of the 
strengthening, in the present case, was not merely to maintain the building, but to 
dramatically improve its structure. Had the work not been done, the building could 
have been barricaded and therefore it would have been rendered worthless as part of 
an income-earning structure. This provided a strong indication that the work was to 
protect a part of the income earning structure and was therefore on capital account. 
However, his Honour did acknowledge that:140 “there could be a situation where a 
building was threatened with closure due to lack of repairs and maintenance. That 
threat would not convert the cost of remedial work into capital expenditure.” 
The second case referred to was Sherlaw v CIR141  where the owner of a boatshed 
sought to repair the slipway, floor and piles of boatshed. Having commenced this, the 
re-piling became a much larger undertaking than anticipated (including the 
replacement of a substantial part of the roof), and it was decided to do other deferred 
maintenance. All this work was held to be on revenue account. The decisive factor in 
Sherlaw was that taxpayer had proceeded in an ad hoc manner. Barber J in Case X26 
quoted Doogue J in Sherlaw:142
“In this case [Sherlaw] once the essential work was commenced other work 
became necessary… This is not a case, however, of the kind referred to me 
where there was one overall construction project resulting in the complete 
reconstruction of the boat-shed or of a project for the deliberate improvement 
of the boat-shed. Here the taxpayer chose to repair the boat-shed and, as a 
                                            
138  See n 110, at 13,323. 
139  [1972] All ER 681. 
140  See n 110, at 12,320. 
141  (1994) 16 NZTC 11,290 (HC). 
142  Ibid, at 11,294. 
 29
result of that decision, he was faced with consequential repair work and 
upgrading becoming necessary.” 
Barber J contrasted Sherlaw with Colonial Motors on the basis that in the latter case 
the work was done as a consequence of a single plan. In Colonial Motors the Court of 
Appeal commented:143 “If there was one overall construction project, it is the total 
work involved in relation to the particular premises which has to constitute ‘repairs or 
alterations of any such asset’”. In that case their Honours’ also observed that the total 
work:144 “… was not and could not sensibly have been the subject of two independent 
unrelated contractual projects, one for strengthening the building and the other for 
new and repair work.”  
His Honour distinguished the present case from Sherlaw as there was a carefully 
delineated scope of work done for the taxpayer and only the work necessary to 
strengthen the building was implemented. The partnership was not required to 
undertake other work in the course of the strengthening.  
Barber J rejected the argument that because the partnership and previous owners had 
deferred doing the earthquake strengthening until required to by the Council this 
meant that when it was actually undertaken the work had the character of deferred 
repairs. Rather his Honour commented that deferred capital improvements remain 
capital improvements when actually completed, whether implemented soon or late.  
How can cases such as Colonial Motors and Case X26 be reconciled with cases such 
as Conn and Sherlaw, cases which all concerned substantial work on the building 
concerned? The answer lies in the second step referred to in the three-fold analysis in 
section 4.2.2 of this paper (the effect of the work on the character of the object) and is 
best expressed by Doogue J in Sherlaw contrasting the facts in that case with Colonial 
Motors:145
“[Sherlaw] is far removed from the transformation of an unsound warehouse 
into a sound commercial building [Colonial Motors] with a substantial 
revenue-earning life. In this case the boat-shed remains a boat-shed of much 
the same lay-out and of the same size as previously.” 
The building in Colonial Motors changed significantly (including the addition of a 
penthouse). Similarly the building in Case X26 also had significant work undertaken 
on it changing it from an unsound to a sound building. His Honour described the work 
in that case as follows:146
“In any case, the work now in issue simply was not maintenance work in 
character but was additional construction work to the corpus of the building 
somewhat similar to adding floors or extending the building structure. In 
effect, the building was semi-caged in steel as an addition to the previous 
structure. That could not be repairing or maintaining work.” 
                                            
143  See n 132, at 11,366. 
144  Ibid. 
145  See n 141, at 11,294. 
146  See n 110, at 12,322. 
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The buildings in Sherlaw and Conn by comparison remained the same size and layout, 
“the work no more than maintained the building’s inherent utility.”147
4.2.5 Additional observations 
4.2.5.1 Increased revenue 
 
The taxpayer argued that the expenditure did not result in any increase in the rentals 
the building was capable of generating (upon annual reviews), which showed that the 
expenditure did not improve the building. Barber J responded that the expenditure 
was necessary to maintain the existing revenue stream and that, citing Highland 
Railway Co v Balderston (Surveyor of Taxes) (Highland Railways),148 “an increase in 
revenue is not a necessary concurrent result of a capital expense which improves a 
capital asset.”149  
 
4.2.5.2 Compliance with Statutory Requirements 
Barber J commented that while the fact that the building required strengthening after 
the partnership was put on notice by the Council was a relevant factor it did not make 
the expenditure a revenue item. “The need to comply with statutory or regulatory 
requirements does not necessarily make the expense one of revenue. The issue is 
always the character of the particular expenditure.”150  
His Honour also observed that the fact that in the future the regulatory authority may 
require further work to be undertaken on the building did not mean that the current 
work lacked an enduring benefit. In this context an enduring benefit is not one that 
will last forever:151  
“When the words ‘permanent’ or ‘enduring’ are used in this connection it is 
not meant that the advantage which will be obtained will last forever.”: Sun 
Newspapers Ltd and Associated Newspapers Ltd v FC of T (1938) 61 CLR 
337, at p 355 per Latham CJ.” 
4.2.5.3 “Cosmetic” alterations 
The taxpayer submitted that some of the alterations were of a “cosmetic” nature. His 
Honour acknowledged that if this was the case that amount might be deductible as 
revenue depending on the precise character of that work. There was no evidence to 
that effect before his Honour but he did reserve leave to the taxpayer to apply in that 
respect. 
                                            
147  IRD, “Repairs and maintenance” (1994) IRD Tax Information Bulletin (February), 9 commenting 
on Conn. 
148  (1889) 2 TC 485. 
149  See n 110, at 12,323. In Highland Railways case the taxpayer incurred the expense of replacing 
steel rails with iron ones without earning any extra revenue as a result. The expenditure was 
considered on capital account because the asset had been materially altered and improved.  
150  Ibid. 
151  Ibid, at 12,324. 
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4.2.5.4 Staggered alterations 
The taxpayer submitted that she could have spread the work out over a period of years 
and charged it to repairs but, for the sake of the tenants of the buildings, decided to 
complete the strengthening project as a whole. Barber J commented that he could only 
deal with facts as they are but had the taxpayer so proceeded, the character of the 
expenditure year by year would still have been of a capital nature.   
Such an approach is in agreement with other cases, including Auckland Gas152 where 
Lord Nicholls in the Privy Council stated that the fact that the replacement work in 
that case was spread over a number of years did not change the Board’s finding (that 
the expenditure was of a capital nature.) His Lordship commented that “The speed or 
slowness with which the work was carried out cannot affect its nature or, hence, its 
proper characterisation.”153 Accordingly, where there is a programme to do work on 
an asset, simply by staggering or spreading repair or replacement work over a number 
of years will not change the character of that expenditure (from capital to revenue for 
example). 
5.0  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Discerning the capital-revenue boundary can be difficult, hence the large volume of 
case law. For the purposes of this paper, the key issue is whether this case law has 
meant that over time making the distinction is simpler and less complex than it 
previously was. At one level, that of the relevant principles to be applied, the  answer 
must be a clear “yes”. Trombitas, in his survey of New Zealand cases on the 
distinction observes that:154
“What is quite interesting is that the capital/revenue principles were very well 
developed by the 1930s [in New Zealand]. Courts in more modern times have 
been ‘maintaining’ the established principles and there appear to be no new 
capital/revenue tests emerging in New Zealand. The same cannot be said for 
Australia and Canada. All of the traditional tests are still being applied today, 
but the test that is being questioned the most is the fixed/circulating capital 
test.” 
 
Templeman J’s comments in Tucker155 that the capital-revenue distinction is “an 
intellectual minefield in which the principles are elusive”, at least in the New Zealand 
context, are no longer applicable. 
 The two cases discussed in this paper illustrate the principled approach adopted by 
the New Zealand courts to determining capital-revenue issues (and referred to by 
Trombitas). In particular, the courts in Fuller and Case X26 acknowledge: 
                                            
152  Auckland Gas Co Ltd v CIR (2000) 19 NZTC 15,702. 
153  Ibid, at 15,708. 
154  E Trombitas, “The New Zealand Judiciary and the Capital/Revenue Distinction at the Beginning of 
the Twenty-First Century” (2006)  In Adrian J Sawyer (Ed.) Taxation Issues in the Twenty-First 
Century (Christchurch: The Centre for Commercial and Corporate Law Inc.) 79, at  94. 
155  See n 6, at 869. 
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(a) the need to determine what the expenditure was calculated to effect from a 
practical and business perspective (the Hallstroms test); 
(b) related to (a), the need to make a “precise analysis of the relevant facts of each 
case”156 and examination of the authorities on point. What may appear to be 
relatively small and insignificant factual differences between cases can alter 
the determination of the character of the expenditure in question; 
(c) the application of the tests established in BP Australia. Not all of these tests 
may be applicable in a particular case. Two tests, the ordinary principles of 
commercial accounting and fixed and circulating capital tests clearly are of 
less relevance; indeed the continuing relevance of the latter test has recently 
been questioned in Fullers (HC) (and Milburn). On the basis of (a) and (b) 
where it is clear that the expenditure under scrutiny is revenue or capital resort 
to these tests is unnecessary, but may confirm the determination made.157
Trombitas correctly concludes that:158
“Having analysed the modern [New Zealand] cases, as well as the historical 
approach of the courts, it may not come as a great surprise to a number of the 
readers that my overall impression can be summed up as follows: ‘There is 
nothing new under the sun in the capital/revenue area.’ This is really saying 
that the courts adopt a very conventional and principled approach in dealing 
with capital/revenue issues – in this sense there is nothing new. There is no 
new approach and there is certainly no magic formula. Of course, statutory 
modifications have been made and will continue to be made.” (emphasis in 
original) 
However, this is not the complete story. Due to the fact that the capital-revenue issue 
is ultimately a factual one, as the two cases in this paper illustrate, there will always 
be scenarios coming before tax advisers and the courts with subtle (and not so subtle) 
factual differences from decided authorities. This creates complexity and uncertainty. 
For example, with respect to strengthening work on a building, is there a level of 
work which is deductible as repairs and maintenance, and if so, where is that level? 
Similarly, had the potential impact of the contract in Fullers been to increase their 
revenue by 10% or 20% would the result have been different?  
 
In addition, from time to time there will arise scenarios where there is no direct 
authority – the tax treatment of lease incentives in New Zealand, prior to Wattie,159 
was such an example. In these cases, the settled principles established and followed 
by the New Zealand courts will assist in determining the character of the expenditure. 
However, ultimately a careful analysis of the particular facts and legal arrangements 
will be crucial to coming to the correct answer.  
                                            
156  See n 20, at 18,841. In the context of repairs and maintenance expenditure, as noted, the New 
Zealand courts usually adopt a three-fold analysis including (i) identifying the asset and (ii) 
examine the effect of the work on the asset. 
157  See also Wild J in Milburn, n 41, at 17,025. 
158 See n 154, at 93-94. 
159  See n 13. 
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This paper has focussed on the approach of the New Zealand courts to the capital-
revenue distinction, as evident in two recent cases. Two extensions of this paper could 
be made. The first, to compare the approach of the New Zealand and Australian courts 
to making the capital-revenue distinction. The second extension could be to compare 
the findings of the courts in these two cases with overseas cases with similar factual 
scenarios.   
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